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UNlFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF 
SUPPORT ACT-EXTRADITION AND RELIEF THEREFROM 
Petitioner was indicted in Ohio for the crime of non-support 
of a minor child. The Governor of Ohio issued an extradition 
warrant to the Governor of California, and petitioner sought his 
release through a habeas corpus action stating that prior to his 
arrest he had petitioned for and secured from the Superior Court 
of San Diego County an order requiring him contribute to the 
support of his wife and minor child in Ohio. He claimed this 
procedure as his right under Section 3115.04 of the Ohio statutes 
which is identical to the California law.1 Both Ohio and Cali-
fornia have adopted the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Sup-
port Act. The pertinent language of that act is contained in 
Section 6 and reads :2 
Any obligor ... who submits to the jurisdiction of the court of 
such other state and complies with the court's order of support, 
shall be relieved of extradition for desertion or nonsupport entered 
in the courts of this state during the period of such compliance. 
Held: that the alleged fugitive obligor may not initiate pro-
ceedings in California, thereby voluntarily submitting to its juris-
diction, and upon compliance with its support order be relieved 
from extradition under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of 
Support Act.a 
The argument against allowing such proceedings as attempted 
by the petitioner in the instant case rests upon a construction of 
other sections in the act entitled "Part III.-Civil Enforcement." 
1 Ohio Rev. Code§ 3115.04 (1953); Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1661 (1953). 
See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-706 (Reissue 1952). The Uniform Reciprocal 
Enforcement of Support Act and the Uniform Support of Dependents Law, 
which is sufficiently similar to the Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act 
to permit reciprocity, have been enacted in 43 states, Hawall, Puerto Rico 
and the Virgin Islands. 9A Uniform Laws Ann. 49, 82 (1953). Nebraska 
approved the 1950 Act on l\Iarch 14, 1951. 
2 9A Uniform Laws Ann. § 6 (1953). 
3 Ex parte Floyd, 273 P.2d 820 (Calif. 1954). 
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Generally, these sections provide that the wife may institute an 
action for support against the husband in state A. State A then 
certifies the petition to state B where the husband is living. A 
hearing is held in state B and the husband is ordered by the court 
in state B to pay support.4 The court reasoned that because this 
procedure was set out, "the act contemplates two distinct courses 
of action in the enforcement of support duties: ( 1) extradition 
and (2) the initiation of civil proceedings in the demanding state, 
with the opportunity thereafter given to the obligor to submit to 
the subsequently assumed jurisdiction of the court in the respond-
ing state."5 In the instant case a civil action of support had not 
been started by the wife against the petitioner in Ohio. The 
court interprets "obligor" as used in Section 6 to be the defendant 
in any support proceeding. Since a civil action had not been be-
gun against the petitioner, he was not a defendant in any support 
action and could not escape extradition under Section 6. The Act, 
however, defines "obligor" much more broadly as "any person 
owing a duty of support."6 
The sections involved, Sections 5 and 6 of the Act, however, 
are contained in Part II of the Act which deals exclusively with 
criminal enforcement. These proceedings are not made dependent 
upon the instigation of civil proceedings under Part III. Section 
6 as part of the criminal provisions is not ambiguous; ambiguity 
exists only when this section is read in association with the civil 
prov1s10ns. The court felt its definition of "obligor" was sup-
ported by the definition of "responding state" as "any state in 
which any proceeding pursuant to the proceeding in the initiating 
state is or may be commenced."7 In the criminal part of the Act, 
however, no reference is made to "initiating state" or "responding 
state" although these terms could have been used to give Section 
6 the meaning relied upon by the California court. 
The policy argument has been made that by allowing the 
obligor to initiate proceedings even though no civil action for 
support is pending, he may be able to buy cheap immunity by an 
order based upon insufficient evidence of the family's circum-
stances. It is argued that a California court does not know all 
4 For an excellent discussion see Brockelbank, Multiple-State Enforce-
ment of Family Support, 2 St. Louis U.L.J. 27 (1952); Brockelbank, The 
Problem of Family Support: A New Uniform Act Offers a Solution, 37 
A.B.A.J. 93 (1951). 
o Ex parte Floyd, 273 P.2d 820, 823 (1954). Emphasis supplied. 
6 9A Uniform Laws Ann. § 1 (3) (1953); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-702 
(Reissue 1952). 
7 Ibid. 
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the facts concerning the wife in Ohio. Since the husband will 
only give facts favorable to himself, the order of the California 
court may not provide adequate support for the wife in Ohio. 
But as the dissenting opinion points out in the instant case, it is 
possible for justice to be done by literally following Section 6 
since, "the courts are not powerless to devise a fair and appropri-
ate procedure to be followed which would permit the evidence of 
the obligee (i.e., the obligee's conditions, circumstances, or needs) 
to be as fully presented in our courts as would be the case if the 
support proceedings are initiated in the obligee's home state .... "8 
The Commissioner's Prefatory Note to the Act points out 
that Section 6 is, "designed to encourage voluntary compliance 
which will be much more profitable to both states than the ex-
pensive procedure of extradition."9 Other policy considerations 
are the possibility of the obligor losing his job or at the least 
losing his wages, his lessened chance for gainful employment 
in the demanding state due to a criminal record, the odds against 
a reconciliation of the family under such a situation and even 
the possibility of the husband becoming an added expense to the 
state.10 
This decision which makes extradition mandatory uponn the 
obligor unless civil proceedings are first brought by the obligee 
in the demanding state seems clearly contradictory to all the 
policy considerations behind the Act and the practical objective of 
obtaining voluntary compliance. 
Lyman C. Johnson, '56 
s Ex parte Floyd, 237 P.2d 820, 823 (Calif. 1954). 
9 9A Uniform Laws Ann., Pocket Part, 54 (1953). 
10 Supra note 5. Report of Judiciary Committee on L.B. 61, Neb. Legis., 
62d Sess. ( 1951). 
